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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2473 
 ___________ 
 
 STEVEN JANKOWSKI, 




EXTENDICARE HOMES, INC., 
d/b/a Abington Crest Nursing & Rehabilitation Center 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania  
 (D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-00006) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 30, 2011 
 Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 







 Pursuant to Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the District Court 
entered an order in June 2010, dismissing the underlying employment discrimination suit 
based on a settlement agreement between Steven Jankowski and his former employer, 
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Extendicare Homes, Inc.  Tenths months later, Jankowski moved to seal the entire record 
of his suit in case number 10-cv-00006.  In a letter to the District Court, Jankowski stated 
that despite his having “worked 18 years as [a] nurse with [a] clean nursing record and 
good qualifications, no one will hire me after they do a background check and see that I 
filed a lawsuit against my former employer.”  (DC dkt #13, pg. 1.) 
 The District Court denied Jankowski’s motion to seal.  In doing so, the District 
Court took note of our precedent holding that there is a presumption of access to judicial 
records, see In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 194 (3d Cir. 2001), that a party seeking to 
seal a portion of the judicial record bears the burden of demonstrating that “disclosure 
will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking disclosure,”  Miller v. 
Ind. Hosp., 16 F.3d 549, 551 (3d Cir. 1994), and, further, that “[a] party who seeks to seal 
an entire record faces an even heavier burden.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  The District 
Court determined that Jankowski “failed to establish that the need for secrecy outweighs 
the presumption in favor of access [to judicial records].”  (DC Op., dkt #14 at pg. 2).  
Jankowski appealed.1
 We will summarily affirm the District Court’s order denying the motion to seal 
because we agree that Jankowski has not carried his heavy burden of overcoming the 
presumption of access to judicial records.  Before the District Court, Jankowski claimed 
to have suffered a two-and-one-half-years employment drought, based on his alleged 
 
                                                 
1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the District Court’s order 
denying the motion to seal.  In re Newark Morning Ledger Co., 260 F.3d 217, 220 (3d 
Cir. 2001).  We may summarily affirm an order of the District Court “if it clearly appears 
that no substantial question is presented” by the appeal.  I.O.P. 10.6. 
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blacklisting by employers of nurses.  But Jankowski did not present the District Court 
with any evidence of having applied for nursing positions—or any other jobs for that 
matter—during that period of time.  Even assuming that he did apply for certain nursing 
positions, Jankowski did not present any evidence either indicating that he was actually 
qualified for those specific positions, or indicating why his applications were otherwise 
rejected.   
 In Cendant Corp., we stated that, for “the party seeking the closure of a hearing or 
the sealing of part of the judicial record[,] . . . [b]road allegations of harm, bereft of 
specific examples or articulated reasoning, are insufficient.”  260 F.3d at 194; see also 
LEAP Sys., Inc. v. MoneyTrax, Inc., 638 F.3d 216, 222 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that 
“LEAP’s vague assertions that the transcript [memorializing the terms of the parties’ 
settlement agreements] contains ‘secretive business information,’ and that disclosure 
would ‘render LEAP at a tactical disadvantage,’” were, without more, insufficient to 
justify unsealing that portion of the judicial record).  That statement holds true here and 
it, in tandem with the reasons given by the District Court, directs that we affirm. 
 
